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Abstract. Economic performance of different fleet segments varies considerably from year to year, with some segments 
experiencing increased profitability while others experience decreased profitability. This variation is generally considered to 
be a consequence of the stochasticity in the industry. However, there is growing evidence that fisheries may not be as 
stochastic as generally thought. In this paper, a spatial bioeconomic model is developed of a multi-species multi-gear 
fishery, which assumes individual profit maximising behaviour. It is shown that inter-annual variations in profits are a 
function of the spatial behaviour of the fishers, which tends to vary chaotically over time. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The increase in information available on the economic 
performance of fishers over the last decade has allowed 
a common feature to be identified, namely that fishing 
incomes are highly variable from year to year. These 
trends are apparent in a wide range of fisheries subject 
to varying management conditions (see, for example, 
ABARE 1999 and earlier issues, LEI-DLO 1999 and 
earlier issues, Danish Institute of Fisheries Economics 
(SJFI) 1999 and earlier issues). While overall trends in 
respective fisheries are influenced by the underlying 
levels of exploitation of the stocks, the economic 
performance of different fleet segments within these 
fisheries tends to fluctuate around the general trend, 
with one segment performing better than another one 
year and worse the next.  
 
The intra-fleet variation is often attributed to chance, 
as fisheries are generally considered highly stochastic. 
This stochasticity is generally considered a result of the 
process of hunting for an unseen mobile resource (the 
finding of which contains an element of “luck”), 
environmental fluctuations and fluctuations in the 
market. Different groups have “good” years and “bad” 
years that tend to average out over time. 
 
Empirical evidence for substantial variation in 
individual performance can be traced back to the 
earliest studies of catching power (Gulland 1956, 
Houghton 1977), though until fairly recently few such 
studies considered the issue of stochasticity in much 
detail. One important exception is the work by Hilborn 
and Ledbetter (1985), which reported that some two-
thirds of the variation in catching power amongst 
fishermen in the British Columbia purse seine fleet was 
due to 'chance' while the remaining one-third was 
attributable to differences in fishing skill and vessel 
equipment. Generally, though, the assumption that 
stochastic influences must inevitably play an important 
role in explaining why individual fishermen or groups 
are more successful than others at exploiting the same 
resource has been taken as axiomatic.  
 
Recent studies of efficiency in fisheries, however, 
suggest that much of the variation in catches between 
individuals is a function of skipper skill or other 
quantifiable characteristics, with the purely random 
element being less than might be assumed given the 
general assumption of stochasticity. Further, increased 
interest has been taken in considering the applicability 
of chaos theory in explaining fishery performance over 
time. 
 
In this paper, the empirical evidence for stochasticity in 
fisheries is examined by considering recently published 
studies of efficiency in fisheries. A review of the 
arguments for chaotic behaviour as an alternative 
explanation of this variation is also presented. A model 
of a hypothetical fishery is presented that demonstrates 
that fluctuating economic performance can be 
explained by profit maximising behaviour of 
individuals in a fishery with a spatially variable (but 
deterministic) stock.  
 
2.  INDIVIDUAL VARIATIONS IN CATCHING 
ABILITY 
 
The assumption that fisheries are highly stochastic has 
recently been inadvertently challenged empirically IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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through the increasing interest in technical efficiency 
in fisheries. These have sought to estimate the 
contribution of systematic factors to variation in 
individual performance of fishers. These systematic 
factor determine the technical efficiency of the boats, 
and may be a feature of boat characteristics (e.g. age, 
size, electronics etc) or skipper characteristics (e.g. 
age, experience, skill). Non-systematic variations in 
performance are attributed to random variation. 
 
A general stochastic production frontier model can be 
given by: 
 
j j j u v f q ￿ ￿   ) (ln ln x  (1) 
 
where qj is the output produced by firm j, x is a vector 
of factor inputs, vj is the stochastic error term and uj is 
the estimate of the technical inefficiency of firm j. Both 
vj and uj are assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed (iid) with variance 
2
v V and 
2
u V  
respectively.  
 
The proportion of total variation in individual 
performance (taking account of the other inputs used in 
the production process) that can be assumed perfectly 
random is given by  ) (
2 2 2
u v v V V V ￿ , while the 
proportion that is assumed to be attributable to 
differences in efficiency is given by  ) (
2 2 2
u v u V V V ￿ . 
Various combinations of 
2
v V and 
2
u V  are estimated 
during the MLE estimation of the production frontier. 
From these, we can derive an estimate of 
J  ) (
2 2 2
u v u V V V ￿
1.  
 
The estimate of J derived from the MLE results is only 
an approximation of the contribution of inefficiency to 
total variance as the true variance of ui is proportional 
but not exactly equal to Vu
2 (Coelli, Prasada Rao and 
Battese 1999). The corrected relative contribution of 
inefficiency,  J*, is given by (2) (Coelli 1995). 
 
>@ ) 2 /( ) 1 ( / * ￿ ￿ ￿   S S J J J J  (2) 
 
From this, the proportion of individual variation in 
production that is estimated to be stochastic is given by 
1-J*. 
 
                                                        
1 In some studies (e.g. Sharma and Leung 1999), the 
value of J was estimated directly in the MLE 
estimation procedure. For the other studies it was 
derived from the model results. 
To date, only a few studies of technical efficiency in 
fisheries have been published. However, from those 
that have, estimates of the proportion of variation 
between individuals that may be considered purely 
random ranges from as low as 5 per cent to 67 per cent 
(Table 1). Output in these studies has been catch 
(either in quantity or value terms) rather than profits, 
but an assumption is generally made that the relative 
economic performance is related to the relative level of 
output. 
 
The effects of fluctuations in stock on individual 
performance have been removed from these analyses by 
incorporating stock into the production frontiers. 
However, as these studies have not been able to capture 
the exact conditions facing the individual fisher (e.g. 
the stock abundance in the exact areas fished compared 
with the average stock over the fishery as a whole), 
spatial fluctuations in stock abundance will manifest 
themselves as random variations in performance. This 
not withstanding, in three of the five fisheries 
examined, systematic variations in performance (i.e. 
differences in technical efficiency) accounted for over 
half of the variation in fisher performance. 
 
Table 1. Contribution of “luck” to variation in 
production between individual fishers 
Fleet type  Source  JJ * 1-J* 
Dredgers  Kirkley et al (1995)  0.57 0.33  0.67 
  Kirkley et al (1998)  0.78 0.56  0.44 
Trawlers  Coglan  et al (1999)  0.79 0.58  0.42 
 Eggert  (2000)  0.98  0.95  0.05 
Long-liners  Sharma and Leung 
(1999) 
0.68 0.44  0.56 
 
While fisher characteristics may be as important as 
“luck” in determining performance with a given stock 
level, inter-annual fluctuations in performance are 
largely due to stock fluctuations. These are often 
assumed to be as much a function of random 
environmental fluctuations as catch levels and existing 
stock size, as attempts to develop stock recruitment 
relationships have generally proved unreliable. 
However, there is a growing literature suggesting that 
these fluctuations may not be as random as generally 
supposed.  
 
If stock fluctuations are not random, why do they 
appear random, and why do some areas seem to have 
greater stock abundance than others? One answer to 
this is that they may be chaotic. That is, the apparent 
random fluctuations may be deterministic. To 
investigate this further, and to establish the extent to 
which these stock fluctuations are truly random, we 
develop a bioeconomic model of a hypothetical fishery 
with a spatially dispersed set of sub-stocks. This is IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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presented in section 4 of the paper, following a brief 
review of the literature on chaotic behaviour in 
fisheries. 
 
3. CHAOS THEORY AND FISHERIES: A 
REVIEW 
 
The possibility that natural resource systems may 
exhibit chaotic behaviour has been recognised since the 
1970s (May 1974, 1976, May and Oster 1976), though 
it is only comparatively recently that the implications 
of chaos for commercial fisheries has been considered 
in any detail.  
 
Two points should be noted at the outset. Firstly, the 
origins of chaotic behaviour in fisheries are likely to 
stem not simply from the population dynamics of the 
fish stock but also from the economic characteristics of 
the harvesting process. This point is well made by 
Conklin and Kolberg (1994), who address the question 
of whether market-driven harvest activity exerts a 
stabilising or destabilising influence on stock 
fluctuations. They conclude that ‘chaos may be lurking 
in unexpected places in renewable resource models 
when harvest is market-driven’ (p. 179). They test their 
predictions in the context of the Pacific Halibut fishery, 
and conclude that their model is capable of exhibiting 
chaotic behaviour under a range of plausible market 
conditions (p. 180). Secondly, while it is relatively 
straightforward to demonstrate mathematically that 
deterministic chaos is potentially important in 
fisheries, it has yet to be established how far the 
fluctuations in system outputs (biomass, yield, etc.) 
which are typically observed in the real world are due 
to chaos rather than to stochastic influences. Indeed, 
the assertion by Wilson et al. (1994) that fisheries are 
'probably chaotic' (p. 305) has been challenged by 
Fogarty (1995), who claims that relatively few 
examples of chaos in ecological systems have been 
documented (p. 438). Referring again to the study by 
Conklin and Kolberg (1994), the authors are careful to 
stress that even though their model exhibited many of 
the features of chaos (e.g. dramatic instability under 
certain circumstances), the Pacific Halibut fishery to 
which it was applied was not necessarily on the verge 
of behaving chaotically (p. 180). 
 
To the extent that some fisheries are chaotic or could 
become so if the conditions dictated, what does this 
imply for their analysis and management? To start with 
it seems to be generally accepted that attempts at long-
term forecasting of system outputs will be a largely 
vacuous exercise due to sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions. Short-term forecasting may still be 
possible, however, though its accuracy will depend on 
the type of forecasting model used. As McGlade (1994) 
points out, the predictive power of short-term 
forecasting will be poor when chaotic time series are 
modelled using a linear stochastic process. 
Nevertheless, while the long-term unpredictability of 
chaotic fisheries systems may undoubtedly complicate 
the task of resource managers, it does not negate the 
management function completely. As Fogarty (1995) 
asserts, the issues of predictability and control are 
separate. It is far from clear, however, precisely what 
the best approach to managing chaotic fisheries should 
be. Grafton and Silva-Echenique (1997) argue that the 
uncertainty caused by chaos does not necessarily imply 
a ‘precautionary’ approach to fisheries management 
but rather a ‘mixed strategy’ approach (i.e. using more 
than one regulatory instrument). This will provide 
managers with more options for controlling fisheries 
even when the dynamics of the system are not known. 
Wilson et al. (1994) see the solution in terms of a shift 
away from the traditional management approach of 
controlling the number and quantity of fish taken and 
towards measures which address the ‘relatively stable 
parameters of fisheries systems - habitat and basic 
biological processes, and that this demands 
management attention to the fine as well as the broad 
scale attributes of the system’ (p. 290). They interpret 
this as requiring rules aimed at controlling fishing 
practices (‘how’) and which recognise the spatio-
temporal characteristics of the fishery (‘when’ and 
‘where’).  
 
4.  A HYPOTHETICAL MODEL OF 
SPATIALLY INDUCED CHAOTIC 
BEHAVIOR 
 
4.1 Model  description 
 
Although the model is based on a hypothetical fishery, 
it is similar in many respects to many inshore fisheries 
along the UK coast, particularly the English Channel. 
The hypothetical fishery is based on five adjacent ports. 
Boats in the ports can target a variety of species and 
can travel to adjacent regions to fish if the expected 
returns are greater than those expected to be achieved 
by fishing directly out from the port. Only two generic 
‘species’ are assumed to exist: ‘shellfish’ and ‘finfish'. 
The fishery is assumed to consist of five separate sub-
stocks of each of the two species, with one sub-stock of 
each species adjacent to a main fishing port. The stocks 
are arranged linearly, and some migration takes place 
between adjoining sub-stocks. Hence, the stock size in 
any one period is a function of the natural growth in 
the sub-stock and the migration into and from adjacent 
regions. The spatial distribution of the fishery is 
illustrated in Figure 1. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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 Figure 1. Spatial distribution of the fishery 
Each boat has a total number of days available to 
participate in the fishery. The available days are 
allocated between fishing time and steaming time (i.e. 
the time taken to reach the fishing ground). The boats 
in each port can allocate their effort between the two 
species and between the stocks. However, the amount 
of steaming time required to reach the fishing area 
increases the further the boat travels from the port. 
Hence, boats can maximise their fishing time by 
fishing in the adjacent fishing areas to their port. 
Alternatively, boats can move to other areas, but reduce 
the potential time available to fish by doing so (and 
incur greater steaming costs). 
 
Prices were assumed to vary with the quantity landed. 
A separate price was estimated for each port based on 
the quantity landed in the port and the total landed in 
the fishery as a whole. This prevented the product from 
being harvested and landed only in the most dense 
areas of the fishery. 
The model is run in two stages. In the first stage, the 
equilibrium level of boats in each port, effort allocation 
and catch was estimated. The stock of each species was 
assumed to have a simple logistic growth (Gordon 
1954, Schaefer 1954), with each sub-stock having a 
separate growth model incorporating the carrying 
capacity of that area. The allocation of boats and fleet 
size is based on the short run profit maximising 
combination (i.e. revenue less variable costs). Fixed 
and capital costs were not included in the model so an 
estimation of resource rent is not obtainable. However, 
if the fishery was subject to free and open access, an 
appropriate assumption would be that the fixed costs 
are equal to the resultant gross margin such that the 
level of rent in the fishery is zero.  
 
While the movement of the boats between areas was 
unrestricted (and hence could be considered a series of 
sequential open access fisheries), it is assumed that no 
new boats would enter and none leave. While zero 
rents would discourage new entrants, any reduction in 
rents would not force existing boats out in the short 
term due to the non-malleability of capital. 
 
The second stage of the model is dynamic rather than 
static. The equilibrium fleet is fixed in each port. 
However, the catch-effort relationships faced by the 
fleet are essentially linear in the short term. Effort can 
be applied to either the fish or shellfish stocks (or 
both). Because of the profit maximising assumption 
underpinning the model, effort is applied such that 
marginal returns are equated across the fishery – either 
in the home region or adjacent regions – taking into 
account the cost of steaming to the adjacent region. 
This is consistent with the models of multi-purpose 
boats proposed by Anderson (1982). Stocks varied from 
year to year based on the difference between the surplus 
growth and the catch. 
 
4.2  Mathematical specification of the model 
 
The model was developed as a non-linear 
programming model written in GAMS (General 
Algebraic Modelling System) (Brooke et al 1992). The 
key equations used in the model and associated data are 
presented below. 
 
Biological component 
The biological model was assumed to be spatially 
linear (Figure 1), and adopted from Sanchirico and 
Wilen (1999). The stock was assumed to consist of 5 
sub-stocks, with migration occurring between adjacent 
stocks. Other functional forms of the spatial structure 
are available (see Sanchirico and Wilen 1999), 
although have not yet been applied in the model.  
 
Catch and effort relationships 
The model incorporates a basic catch effort 
relationship, given by 
 
Qq E S psa s psa sa ,, ,, ,    (3) 
where  Qp,s,a is the catch of boats from port p in area a 
of species s, qs is the catchability coefficient of species 
s, Ep,s,a is the level of effort expended by the boats from 
port p in area a on species s and Ss,a is the stock size of 
species s in area a.  
 
In the equilibrium model, the total level of catch of 
each species had to equal the level of surplus 
production from the stock, plus the equilibrium level of 
immigration less the equilibrium level of emigration 
(defined as the levels of immigration and emigration 
when all stocks are in equilibrium). A logistic growth 
model (Schaefer 1954) was assumed, such that 
 IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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where  rs is the instantaneous growth rate and ks,a is the 
carrying capacity of the stock in each area, Ia,a1 is the 
immigration rate of fish from area a1 to area a and 
Ea,a1 is the emigration rate of fish from area a to area 
a1. The migration (both immigration and emigration) 
rates between adjacent regions were assumed to be 0.1 
for the shellfish species and 0.2 for the fish species. 
 
In the long run equilibrium model, the stock size of 
each species is endogenous to the model. In the 
dynamic portion of the model, the stock size is 
exogenous. The initial stock size (year one) is taken as 
the equilibrium stock size, estimated by equating catch 
to the surplus growth in (4). In the dynamic model, the 
stock size in the following years is calculated between 
model runs, and is given by 
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 (5) 
That is, the stock in year t is the stock in the previous 
year plus the growth in the previous year less the catch 
in the previous year. 
 
The level of effort that can be expended by boats is 
limited by the available fishing time and the time taken 
to reach the fishing ground, such that 
 
ET t B psa
a s
pa p ,, , () ƒ ƒ ￿  1
 (6) 
where  Tp,a is the additional time required to steam from 
port p to area a, t is the number of days a boat can fish 
(with t=1 for all boats) and Bp is the number of boats in 
each port. Steaming time was assumed to be increase 
as a proportion of time available, with Tp,a = 0 for p=a, 
increasing to Tp,a=1 if the port and area are at opposite 
ends of the fishery (i.e. port 1 and area 5 or vice versa). 
 
In the equilibrium model, the number of boats in each 
port was endogenous to the model. In the dynamic 
model, the number of boats was fixed at the level 
produced by the equilibrium model. 
 
The parameters in the model used in the catch and 
effort relationships are given in Table 2. The values 
were assumed the same for all areas 
 
Table 2. Catch and effort relationship parameters 
 Shellfish  Fish 
rs  0.5 0.5 
ks,a  1 2 
qs,a  1 1 
Revenue and costs 
The revenue in each port is estimated as the product of 
the quantity landed and the price. Price was assumed to 
vary based on a linear price-quantity relationship, 
given by 
 
Pp Q Q ps s psa psa
a p a
,
*
,, ,,  ￿￿ ƒ ƒ ƒ EE 12
 (7) 
where  p*s is the maximum price (i.e. the intercept, 
p*shellfish= 4, p*fish=2), and E1,  E2 are the slope 
coefficients of the demand curve relating to local 
landings and total landings respectively (E1 = 0.1, E2 = 
1). Hence, the market price was assumed to be affected 
by both the quantities landed locally as well as the total 
landings in the fishery.  
 
Costs are assumed to be a function of the level of effort 
only. The total costs in each port are given by 
 
Cf E T pp a s
s a
pa  ￿ ƒ ƒ ,, , () 1
 (8) 
where  f is the fuel cost per unit of time (f=0.2), where 
time include both fishing time and steaming time. 
 
The total gross margin in each port (Gp) is given by 
 
GP Q C pp s p s a p
a s p
 ￿ ƒ ƒ ƒ ,, ,
 (9) 
while the total gross margin for the fishery as a whole 
(the objective function of the model) is given by 
 
OBJ Gp
p
  ƒ
 (10) 
4.3  Simulation results 
 
The model was run over a 50 year period. The starting 
values (year 1) for the model was the equilibrium 
solution (i.e. fleet number, effort allocation and 
equilibrium stocks).  
 
Although initially in equilibrium, moving from a long 
run catch-effort relationship to a short run relationship IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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resulted in a reallocation of effort and initial 
fluctuations in catches of the two species. With an 
equilibrium yield curve, there are diminishing returns 
to effort for each species. With the short run yield 
curve, there are constant returns to effort. Hence, 
greater effort was initially applied to the more valuable 
species (shellfish) than under equilibrium conditions. 
This resulted in the stocks of this species declining and 
a consequent reallocation to the alternative species 
(fish) in the second year.  
 
As a result, the fishery tended to oscillate with shifts in 
effort between species occurring each year rather than 
maintain an equilibrium position. In addition, effort 
moved to adjacent regions when the marginal value of 
fishing in those adjacent regions were higher than 
remaining in ‘home’ region.  
 
The estimated profit in each port and for the fishery as 
a whole is shown in Figure 2. From this, it can be seen 
that the profits fluctuate considerably over time in each 
port. These fluctuations do not necessarily form a 
regular pattern for each port (i.e. ‘good’ year followed 
by a ‘bad’ year). Instead, they are characterised by an 
occasional ‘good’ year, followed by a number of years 
that may be considered ‘average’, with the occasional 
‘bad’ year’. Further, the fluctuations differ in each 
port, with one port having a ‘good’ year while another 
may be having an ‘average’ or ‘bad’ year. This is 
consistent to what is often observed in real fisheries, 
where economic performance of fishers varies across a 
fishery. 
 
At the level of the fishery as a whole (i.e. all ports), the 
fishery profits declined rapidly from their equilibrium 
level. With the exception of a couple of years, the 
apparent inter-annual variation in profits at the 
aggregate level was less than at the port level. 
Aggregate profits tended to stabilise at a level below 
the equilibrium level in the latter part of the 
simulation.  
 
The equilibrium profits, as well as the mean over time 
and coefficient of variation (CV)
2 relating to each port 
is given in Table 3. Despite the initial identical 
resource base, price and cost structure, the average 
profit of boats in the centre region was marginally 
greater than that of the boats from the outer regions 
(ports 1 and 5), although it was subject to higher 
variability. As the cost of exploiting other regions  
                                                        
2 This is a relative measure of variability derived by 
dividing the standard deviation by the mean and 
presenting the result as a percentage. 
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Figure 2. Simulated profits by port and total fishery over time IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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increased the further away the region, boats on the 
‘edge’ of the fishery were penalised by costs in 
exploiting more than their own and one adjacent 
region. Other regions could be exploited but at a higher 
cost. In contrast, boats in the centre ports (2, 3 and 4) 
could each exploit two additional regions for the same 
additional cost. 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics relating to each port 
  Port 1  Port 2  Port 3  Port 4  Port 5  All 
ports 
Equilibrium 
profits 
0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 2.85 
Mean over 
time 
0.51 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.51 2.60 
CV  12% 10% 14% 11% 12%  3% 
 
The sub-stocks adjacent to the centre ports also had 
migration to and from the two adjacent areas, whereas 
the peripheral stocks had migration to and from only 
one adjacent area. As a result, these sub-stocks 
fluctuated by a greater amount than the peripheral sub-
stocks (Table 4). In Figure 3, the stocks in areas 1 and 
3 (a peripheral area and the central area) are compared 
for the two ‘species’. It can be seen that not only do the 
fluctuations vary in intensity, but also that the areas are 
subject to different relative stock abundance (i.e. ‘high’ 
in one area but ‘low’ in the other in the same year). 
With a linear relationship between stock size and 
catch, then the catches of the boats adjacent to these 
stocks would follow a similar pattern. While boats were 
able to move from one area to another, the additional 
cost of doing this reduced the incentive unless the 
differential in profitability in the areas exceeded the 
cost. 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics relating to each stock 
  Area 1  Area 2  Area 3  Area 4  Area 5 
Shellfish       
Equilibrium 
stock 
0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 
Mean over 
time 
0.44 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.44 
CV  9% 12% 10% 12%  8% 
       
Fish       
Equilibrium 
stock 
1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 
Mean over 
time 
1.69 1.67 1.66 1.66 1.68 
CV  7% 8%  10% 9% 7% 
 
The disequilibrium dynamic simulation also produced 
another interesting result. The higher unit price for 
shellfish (and common cost of effort) resulted in this 
species being targeted more in each area. As a result, 
the average shellfish stock was less than the 
equilibrium level. In contrast, the average fish stock 
was higher than in equilibrium as less effort was 
generally applied to fish in the dynamic simulations. 
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Figure 3. Estimated stock abundance in areas 1 and 3 
over time 
 
As a consequence, because of the chaotic behaviour of 
the stocks and the response to this by fishers, the 
equilibrium situation is not achieved, even over a 50 
year time period. Further (as previously noted), profits 
in the long run are less than what could be achieved in 
a controlled fishery, even without new entrants. 
 
 
5. STABILISATION  POLICIES 
 
As with the model of Conklin and Kolberg (1994), the 
above model results are consistent with chaotic 
behaviour, and are purely deterministic – the result of 
profit maximising behaviour in a non-linear ecological 
and economic system. Had these fluctuations in stocks 
and economic performance been observed in a true 
fishery, they would have been taken as further evidence 
of the stochastic nature of fisheries. 
 
What does it mean, though, for fisheries management 
if fisheries are chaotic? Like highly stochastic events, 
chaotic events are impossible to predict with any 
accuracy both in the short and long run. As a result, 
knowing a fishery is actually deterministic but chaotic 
is of little benefit to fisheries managers when trying to 
estimate future yields. Similarly, estimating an 
appropriate total allowable catch is equally problematic 
for either a stochastic or chaotic fishery. 
 
As Wilson et al (1994) pointed out, knowing fisheries 
are chaotic can lead to different forms of management 
being appropriate. In particular, as chaos derives from 
the large number of non-linearities in the ecological 
and economic system, measures to stabilise some of 
these parameters may stabilise the fishery. 
 IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Two further simulations were undertaken using the 
model. The first simulation held prices constant at the 
equilibrium level while the second simulation allowed 
prices to vary but prevented fishers from operating 
outside the area adjacent to their port. The purpose in 
these simulations was to estimate the effects of 
reducing some of the potential interactions in the 
system on the flow of profits in the fishery.  
 
In both cases, reducing the potential interactions in the 
model resulted in lower variance in the results at the 
port level (Table 5). Holding prices constant also 
resulted in higher average profits that in the base run. 
However, at the fishery level, the amount of variation 
was substantially greater. This is because the effects of 
regional ‘good’ and ‘bad’ years tended to even out 
across the fishery in the base run.  
 
Table 5. Constant prices and restricted movement 
  Port 1  Port 2  Port 3  Port 4  Port 5  All 
ports 
Constant 
prices 
      
Mean over 
time 
0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 2.79 
CV  7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
No movement        
Mean over 
time 
0.51 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.53 2.61 
CV  11% 10% 11%  9% 11%  2% 
 
Prevening movement of boats out of the areas not 
adjacent to their ports had little impact on the average 
profits in the model results (Table 5). These were found 
to be marginally higher in ports 2 and 5 and 
marginally lower in port 2. With the exception of port 
2 (which remained the same), variability in profits was 
generally lower. 
 
While the impact of these restrictions are marginal at 
the port level, the impact at the fishery level is 
substantial. Restricting the movement of the boats 
results in a much more stable fishery, with the large 
fluctuations in profits being avoided (Figure 4). In 
contrast, holding prices constant results in much 
greater inter-annual fluctuations in the fishery as a 
whole, with the fishery alternating from high to low 
profits of equal amounts each year. Hence, while 
constant prices reduce the overall variance in the 
system at the port level, allowing prices to fluctuate 
tends to have a stabilising effect (rather than 
destabilising) on the fishery as a whole. 
 
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
Time
P
r
o
f
i
t
s
area res trictions
cons tant prices
bas e run
 
Figure 4. Fishery level profits under the different 
scenarios 
 
 
6.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Studies of technical efficiency of individual fishers 
have generally found that around half of the variation 
in performance is due to differences in efficiency and 
the other half due to random events. However, while 
these studies have been able to incorporate inter-annual 
variations in stock abundance (assumed exogenous and 
random), they do not generally take account of spatial 
differences in abundance. Such variation would 
manifest itself as ‘noise’ in the technical efficiency 
studies. 
 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that such noise 
may be the result of a spatially diverse environment. 
Further, in such an environment the fluctuations in 
abundance may be a direct result of the profit 
maximising behaviour of the fishers rather than 
random events. 
 
While most countries have licence programs that limit 
access to particular areas, these are generally 
geographically large. From the results of this model, 
smaller geographical definition of fisheries for the 
purpose of licensing may be beneficial if stability is an 
objective of management. Ironically, the ability of 
fishers to change fishing areas and gears in response to 
fluctuations in stock abundance is generally regarded 
as a desirable feature of a fishery. This is because the 
greater flexibility is thought to have a stabilising effect 
on incomes. However, from the results in this paper, 
this flexibility may be contributing to the fluctuations. 
Hence, while the effect of fluctuating stocks in any one 
year on incomes may be mitigated by changing area or 
gear, this perpetuates the fluctuations. 
 
The model does not allow for any random component. 
While the results suggest that fluctuations in stock may 
be consistent with deterministic but chaotic behaviour, IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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there is most likely still some element of randomness in 
fisheries. Although not presented in this paper, 
introducing a random shock into one are of the model 
fishery in one year was found to have a substantial 
destabilising effect. Again, however, restricting access 
of the boats resulted in the greatest stabilising effect. 
 
Wilson  et al (1994) suggested that the existence of 
chaos in fisheries meant that fishery managers may 
need to move away from the traditional mix of controls 
on how much fish to be caught, and to look at how and 
where they are caught. The results of this study tend to 
support these suggestions. 
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 Economic performance of fishers:
stochastic or chaotic?
Sean Pascoe and David Whitmarsh
Centre for the Economics and Management of 
Aquatic Resources
University of PortsmouthCEMARE
Outline
❚ ￿Random￿ variations in economic performance
❚ Contribution of stochasticity to individual 
performance
❚ Potential for chaotic behaviour
❚ Model of chaotic behaviour
❙ function of spatial distribution of stock and profit 
maximising behaviour
❚ Policy implicationsCEMARE
Variations in economic 
performance
❚ Within any population of fishers
❙ some have ￿good￿ year
❙ some have ￿bad￿ year
❚ between years also have ￿good￿ and ￿bad￿ 
years
❚ Generally assumed that variation due to 
stochasticity e.g. environmental 
fluctuationsCEMARE
❚ studies of technical 
efficiency
❙ separate efficiency 
from stochastic 
variability
❙ γ=
❙
) (
2 2 2
u v u σ σ σ +
[] ) 2 /( ) 1 ( / * − − + = π π γ γ γ γ
Individual variation in 
performance
Fleet type Source γγ ∗ 1-γ*
Dredgers Kirkley et al 
(1995) 0.57 0.33 0.67
Kirkley et al 
(1998) 0.78 0.56 0.44
Trawlers Coglan et al 
(1999) 0.79 0.58 0.42
Eggert (2000) 0.98 0.95 0.05
Long-liners Sharma and 
Leung (1999) 0.68 0.44 0.56
❚ random component 
ranges from 5 to 67 per 
cent
❚ exclude spatial variation 
in stockCEMARE
Chaos theory and fisheries
❚ ￿stochastic￿ element of performance may not be 
￿luck￿
❚ fluctuations in performance may be due to 
￿non-linearities￿ in the ecological and economic 
system
❙ stock-recruitment, predator-prey
❙ prices, targeting behaviour of fishers
❚ Several suggestions that variations may be 
chaotic rather than stochasticCEMARE
Model of spatial fishery
❚ 5 areas
❚ 5 ports (fleets)
❚ 2 stocks 
❙ fish, shellfish
❚ fishers can switch between areas and 
species
❚ prices vary due to total and local landings 
in each port
Sub-
stock 1
Sub-
stock 2
Sub-
stock 3
Sub-
stock 4
Sub-
stock 5
growth migration
Port 1 Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5CEMARE
Simulation
❚ Model run over 50 years
❚ catcht=f(stockt, effortt)
❚ stockt=f(stockt-1, migration, catcht-1)
❚ starting point was long run equilibrium
❙ catch = surplus growthCEMARE
Results: profits
❚ ￿random￿ 
fluctuations in 
profits from 
year to year
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Al l  ports
Port 1 Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5 All ports
Equilibrium 
profits 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 2.85
Mean over 
time 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.51 2.6
CV 12% 10% 14% 11% 12% 3%CEMARE
Results: stocks
❚ Apparent ￿random￿ 
fluctuations in stocks
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Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4 Area 5
Shellfish
Equilibrium 
stock 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
Mean over 
time 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.44
CV 9% 12% 10% 12% 8%
Fish
Equilibrium 
stock 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54
Mean over 
time 1.69 1.67 1.66 1.66 1.68
CV 7% 8% 10% 9% 7%CEMARE
Stabilisation policies
❚ Reduce ￿non-
linearities￿ in 
the system
❙ prices
❙ movement 
between areas
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area restrictions
constant prices
base run
Port 1 Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5 All ports
Constant 
prices
Mean 
over time
0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 2.79
CV 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
No 
movement
Mean 
over time
0.51 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.53 2.61
CV 11% 10% 11% 9% 11% 2%CEMARE
Conclusions
❚ Fisheries may be less random than 
thought
❙ variations due to profit maximising behaviour and a 
spatially diverse resource
❚ While this doesn￿t make fisheries 
predictable, has implications for how 
fisheries managed
❙ greater restrictions on movement in fisheries may be 
desirable